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ABSTRACT
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide
how some fixed value should be shared among them. We
are interested in settings where the share that each agent
receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other
members of the group, where highly regarded agents re-
ceive a greater share compared to agents that are not well
regarded. We introduce two mechanisms for determining
agents’ shares: the peer-evaluation mechanism, where each
agent gives a direct evaluation for every other member of
the group, and the peer-prediction mechanism, where each
agent is asked to report how they believe group members will
evaluate a particular agent. The sharing is based on the pro-
vided information. While both mechanisms are individually
rational, the first mechanism is strategy-proof and budget-
balanced, but it can be collusion-prone. Further, the second
mechanism is collusion-resistant and incentive-compatible.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics
General Terms
Economics, Theory
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1. MODEL AND BACKGROUND
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents that must share a
reward V ∈ ℜ+. We are interested in settings where the
share of V that an agent receives depends on evaluations
that its peers make concerning the agent’s contribution to
the group. Hence, each agent i ∈ N is asked to provide
evaluations for all peers. Such evaluations can be either
direct evaluations or predictions of absolute frequencies of
received evaluations. For avoiding a biased self-evaluation,
an agent is not requested to provide evaluations for itself.
Given a positive integer parameter 0 < M ≤ V , the direct
evaluations made by an agent i ∈ N are formally represented
by the vector ti = (t
1
i , . . . , t
i−1
i , t
i+1
i , . . . , t
n
i ), where t
j
i ∈
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{0, . . . ,M} represents agent i’s evaluation given to agent
j, and
∑
j 6=i t
j
i = M . Hence, the parameter M represents
the top possible evaluation that an agent can receive and an
explicit constraint that bounds the sum of direct evaluations.
The predictions made by agent i are formally represented
by the vector ri = (r
1
i , . . . , r
i−1
i , r
i+1
i , . . . , r
n
i ), where r
j
i =
(rj
0
i , . . . , r
jM
i ) represents the agent i’s prediction for the ab-
solute frequency of evaluations given to agent j, i.e. rj
k
i ∈
{1, . . . , n− 1}, for 0 ≤ k ≤M , and
∑M
k=0 r
jk
i = n− 1.
The evaluations are submitted to a central entity called
mechanism, which is responsible for sharing the reward. This
entity relies only on reported evaluations when determining
agents’ shares. We assume that evaluations are indepen-
dent across agents, that evaluations provided by an agent
for its peers are independent among themselves, and that
agents act to maximize their expected shares. This implies
that agents may deliberately lie when providing evaluations
for others. Therefore, we distinguish between the true eval-
uations made by agent i, ti for direct evaluations and ri
for predictions, and the evaluations that it reports to the
mechanism, xi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
i−1
i , x
i+1
i , . . . , x
n
i ). We overload
the notation using xi to denote both direct evaluations and
predictions, but we make clear its meaning when necessary.
We call xi the strategy of agent i and X = (x1, . . . ,xn)
a strategy profile. We define X−i = (x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1,
. . . ,xn). Thus, we can represent a strategy profile as X =
(xi,X−i). If the reported evaluation of agent i is equal to
its true evaluation, i.e. xi = ti for direct evaluations or
xi = ri for predictions, then we say that agent i’s strat-
egy is truthful, and represent it by
∗
xi. We say that X is
collectively truthful if all reported strategies are truthful.
We denote the share of V given to agent i when all the re-
ported evaluations are X by Γi(X). The most important
property we wish our mechanisms to have is that the share
assigned to each agent should reflect the reported evalua-
tions for that agent. In addition to this requirement, we
would like our mechanisms to be budget-balanced, individ-
ually rational, incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof ), and
collusion-resistant [1]. We consider that a collusion between
agents i and j occurs when agent i changes its truthful eval-
uation for agent j, resulting in the report xˆi 6=
∗
xi, and, for
doing this, it receives a side-payment, p, so that:
1. E [Γi(xˆi,X−i)] + p > E
[
Γi(
∗
xi,X−i)
]
;
2. E [Γj(xˆi,X−i)]− p > E
[
Γj(
∗
xi,X−i)
]
.
Collusions with more than two agents can be decomposed
beneficiary). We say that a mechanism is collusion-resistant
when, for all agents i, j ∈ N and strategies xˆi 6=
∗
xi, where
xˆji >
∗
xji for direct evaluations and
∑M
k=0 k(xˆ
jk
i −
∗
xj
k
i ) >
0 for predictions, we have E [Γi(xˆi,X−i) + Γj(xˆi,X−i)] ≤
E
[
Γi(
∗
xi,X−i) + Γj(
∗
xi,X−i)
]
. To provide incentives for truth-
telling, we use the following strictly proper scoring rule [2]:
R(p, e) = 1 + 2pe −
z∑
j=1
p2j ∈ [0, 2] (1)
where p is a probability distribution and e is the observed
event among z possible outcomes.
2. THE PEER-EVALUATION MECHANISM
The peer-evaluation mechanism announces the parameter
M and requests agents to submit direct evaluations. The
sharing scheme is presented in Algorithm 1. The share re-
ceived by each agent i ∈ N is computed by aggregating its
received evaluations into a variable gradei, and multiplying
it by a normalizing factor V/(n×M). Due to the constraint
imposed on direct evaluations, i.e.
∑
j 6=i x
j
i = M , it is clear
that after this operation
∑n
i=1 Γi = V . Consequently, the
mechanism is budget-balanced. Because the evaluations are
greater than or equal to zero, an agent cannot receive a neg-
ative share. Then, the mechanism is individually rational.
The following theorem states our main result concerning the
properties of the peer-evaluation mechanism.
Theorem 1. The peer-evaluation mechanism is strategy-
proof.
The main drawback of the peer-evaluation mechanism is
that agents do not have direct incentives for lying, but they
also do not have incentives for telling the truth. This charac-
teristic makes the mechanism extremely susceptible to col-
lusions.
3. THE PEER-PREDICTION MECHANISM
The peer-prediction mechanism announces the parame-
ter M and requests agents to submit predictions. We can
see this game as if each agent i was answering the follow-
ing question about each other agent j: “if agents were to
evaluate agent j, what would be the absolute frequency of
the evaluations received by it?”. The sharing scheme is pre-
sented in Algorithm 2. The main idea of the peer-prediction
mechanism is to compute agents’ shares using grades, which
are aggregations of the expected evaluations calculated from
predictions, and using scoring rules [2] to generate scores
and enforce truth-telling. For using scoring rules, it is neces-
sary to have a “reality” to score an assessment. Our solution
considers grades as observed events of an uncertain quantity,
with possible outcomes inside the set {0, . . . ,M}, and scores
the reported predictions as if they were assessments
The sharing process has essentially four steps. The first
one transforms all the predictions about the evaluations for
Algorithm 1 The Peer-Evaluation Mechanism
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: gradei =
∑
j 6=i x
i
j
3: Γi = gradei ×
V
nM
4: end for
Algorithm 2 The Peer-Prediction Mechanism
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: gi =
∑
j 6=i
∑M
k=0
xi
k
j
n−1
× k
3: end for
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: scorei =
∑
j 6=i R


x
j
i
n−1
, nint


gj−
∑M
k=0
x
jk
i
n−1
×k
n−2




n−1
6: gradei =
gi
n−1
7: Γi = (gradei + α× scorei)×
V
(M+2α)n
8: end for
an agent i ∈ N to a positive real number, gi, by creating a
probability distribution from each prediction xi∗, and sum-
ming the expected value of each distribution.
In the second step, the score of each agent i ∈ N is cal-
culated as follows: First, for each agent j 6= i, a probabil-
ity distribution is created from the prediction xji . Second,
a temporary grade for agent j is calculated as the arith-
metic mean of the expected evaluations received by it, with-
out taking into consideration the expected value from agent
i’s prediction. The function nint (nearest integer function)
rounds this temporary grade to an integer number inside the
set {0, . . . ,M}. Finally, the mechanism applies the strictly
proper scoring rule represented by Equation 1 on the prob-
ability distribution (assessment) and the temporary grade
(observed event). In the end, the score of agent i is the
arithmetic mean of results provided by the scoring rule for
each prediction submitted by agent i.
In the third step, agents’ grades are computed as the arith-
metic mean of the expected evaluations received by them.
Finally, they have their shares computed in the last step.
Agents’ scores are multiplied by a constant α > 0 and added
to their grades. The result is then multiplied by a weight
V/(M + 2α)n to form agents’ shares. The constant α fine-
tunes the weight given to scores. Because the highest grade
that an agent can receive is equal to M , and the highest
score is equal to 2α, using the weight V/(M +2α)n guaran-
tees that the mechanism will not make a loss in the case of
every agent receives the highest grade and score. An obvi-
ous consequence of such approach is that when at least one
agent does not receive the highest grade or score, then the
mechanism will make a profit. This implies that it is not
always budget-balanced. Given that scores and grades are
always greater than or equal to zero, the mechanism is in-
dividually rational. The following theorem states our main
result related to the peer-prediction mechanism.
Theorem 2. The peer-prediction mechanism is incentive-
compatible.
Related to collusions, we have the following result:
Theorem 3. If α > M(n−1)/2, then the peer-prediction
mechanism is collusion-resistant.
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